










Inaugural address delivered on February 4th 2002
ABSTRACT: Our trust in competition policy is based on faith in markets.
When markets are oligopolies, already classical economists’ trust in
competition busted: Oligopolies carry the seeds of collusion. To develop,
collusion needs trust between firms. But new leniency programmes are
designed to bust that trust. I discuss when trust busters are likely to succeed
and when trust prevails.
Introduction
There is a sense in which John Stuart Mill defined the field of Law & Economics as a part of
Jurisprudence in his inaugural address to the University of St. Andrews on February 1st 1867,  one
hundred and thirty-five years ago almost to the day:
“Of no less importance than Political Economy is the study of what is called
Jurisprudence; the general principles of law; the social necessities which laws are
required to meet; the features common to all systems of law, and the differences
between them; the requisites of good legislation, the proper mode of constructing a
legal system, and the best constitution of courts of justice and modes of legal
procedure.” (Mill, 1867, pp.  34-35).
Law & Economics studies “the proper mode of constructing a legal system” seen from the point of
view of political economy and analyses “the best constitution of courts of justice and modes of legal
procedure.”
Today, I should like to zoom gradually in on the field within Law & Economics that I know most
about: Antitrust Economics or Competition Policy, as it is commonly called in Europe. The starting
point is the study of the effects of competition legislation on business and society, the positive
                                         
1 I am indebted to my various coauthors for discussions during the last decade or so. It is evident that much of what I
write here (and the joy of the process) derives from joint research. I have tried to pay tribute to their contributions
through referencing. Special thanks to Jochen Lorentzen for his linguistic input without which the title would have been
considerably more boring!
2question, but this naturally leads to a discussion of the proper design of competition laws, the
normative question. These are extremely “hot” topics today. In the last five years or so, we have
seen a surge of changing competition legislation in Denmark, in the EU and in the candidate
countries for EU accession.  Table 1 lists the most important developments in Denmark and the EU
since 1989.i
Table 1: Major development in competition policy
Denmark EU
1989 Competition Act w. control and transparencyMerger Control
1997 New Competition Act w. prohibition More economics-based approach to
vertical agreements
2000 Amended Act: Merger Control Debate on decentralisation and
modernisation
2001 First Danish fines: DKK90,000 - 1.2 millionLe iency reform
2002 Jail sentences for violations?
In 1989 we adopted a new competition legislation in Denmark that was completely out of line with
EC policy at that time. It was based on a principle of control (as opposed to prohibition) so almostii
nothing was prohibited before the Competition Council decided to intervene, typically by an order
to cease and desist. In addition, the main tool in competition policy was the creation of transparency
which was blunt in many respects and might even work against competition in oligopolistic
settings, see Albæk, Møllgaard and Overgaard (1996, 1997).
The Danish Competition Act was completely changed in 1997 after eight years of service, maybe
because of its inadequacy and certainly because of an urge to harmonise with the EC treaty. As in
the EU, anti-competitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position were prohibited and it was
clear from the discussions in Parliament that EU practice should be guiding Danish competition
practice. The new Act stopped short of introducing merger control but an amendment remedied this
already in 2000. For the first time in Danish antitrust history, in late 2001 four firms were convicted
in the electricians' cartels and received fines between DKK90,450 and DKK1,182,800.iii A new
proposal suggests that punishment be made even harsher including jail sentences of up to two years.
In the EU there has been a change in the regime governing vertical agreements (i.e. agree ents
between firms in a distribution channel or a supply chain). From being very legal-form based the
regime is now, since the introduction of C mmission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22
December 1999, more (but not wholly!) based on economics. Second, there is an ongoing debate on
how to implement a more decentralised EU competition policy, allowing national competition
authorities and national courts to apply EU competition rules directly (Monti, 2000). And last, there
is a reform of leniency programmes designed to destabilise cartels by granting immunity from, or
reduction of, fines (EU Commission, 2001). I will have more to say about this proposal towards the
end.
It makes a lot of sense for businesses in particular and society in general to study the
appropriateness of past and proposed legislation for what we want to achieve by competition
legislation: welfare, efficiency and competition. Thus the study of antitrust is a natural element of
Law & Economics.
3In the following I will zoom further in on cartels and how to deal with them within this field of
Antitrust Economics.
In Trust We Bust!iv
Our trust in competition policy must be founded in a belief in the general well-functioning of a
market economy: that as a general rule the detailed operation of markets is left best in the hands of
consumers and business men (Demsetz, 1977; Monti, 2000). Indeed, this must be the reason for the
vast amount of liberalisation and deregulation that we have experienced in the last two decades in
the global economy. Telecommunications, electricity, gas, television and railroads are industries in
which competition is today present to a certain degree, or that are likely to be subjected to
competition relatively soon.
However there is one exception to this trust in competition that is widely recognised and that the
classical economists already acknowledged. That is the problem of collusion and cartels. Society’s
trust in oligopolies’ wish to compete busted very early. Having invented the concept of the
‘invisible hand’ Adam Smith (1776) went on to note that:
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion,
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to
raise prices. …” (Smith, 1776, 144)
and later
“The interest of dealers … in any particular branch of trade or manufactures, is always
in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the public. … The
proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order,
ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till
after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but
with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is
never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to
deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many
occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.” (Smith, 1776, 278)
John Stuart Mill (1857) similarly acknowledged that sometimes “competitors are so few that they
always end by agreeing not to compete” and went on to give a game theory argument that sounds
astonishingly modern:
“In many trades the terms on which business is done are a matter of positive
arrangement among the trade, who use the means they always possess of making the
situation of any member of the body who departs from its fixed customs, inconvenient
or disagreeable.” (Mill, 1857, 298).
In 1890 the Sherman Act was set up partially for that reason. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
prohibits collusion,v declares that it is a felony and determines maximum punishment. Sixty-seven
years later a similar article [81] was introduced in European treaties: It prohibits agreements in
restraint of trade if they affect trade between member countries. Examples of illegal agreements
include price fixing agreements, agreements to limit production and market sharing agreements. In
the EU, the maximum fine is ten per cent of the group’s global turnover. Today, almost all member
countries have harmonised their respective substantive law with that of the EU.
4Even antitrust-sceptic Demsetz (1992) argues that collusion or horizontal coordination is bad and
that trust busters should crack down on it. In addition, the business community tends to think this
way since firms are often the customers of the cartel. Lysine, for example, is not used by final
consumers but acquired by firms, so when the representative of Archer Daniels Midland in a
meeting of the lysine cartel said that “Our competitors are our friends. Our customers are our
enemies”, he was not referring to small consumers but to the largest American purchaser of lysine,
Tyson Foods, and to another large U.S. customer, Con Agra, see Hammond (2001). In general,
society at large seems to agree that collusion is bad and should not go unpunished.
In recent years we have seen a number of cartels surface in the US and in the European Union and
even more recently in Denmark. Prominent EU cartels with a Danish involvement include the
cement cartel, the district-heating pipe cartel and SAS/MærskAir. The level of fines has been
steadily increasing: In the most recent vitamin cartel, Hoffman La Roche was given a fine of EUR
462 million while BASF got a fine of EUR 296 million! Aventis was granted immunity from fines
because it blew the whistle and called in the cavalry. The electricians cartel (a.k.a. “Elmer”) is the
first (and so far, the only) Danish cartel case to have been treated under the new Competition Act by
the court system. In 2001 it lead to a new standard of fines in Denmark: The largest fine was more
than DKK 1 million. In this cartel, firms were also granted reductions in their fines because of
cooperation with the authorities, so the new competition policy includes a leniency programme.
Collusion is a matter of trust
Members of an oligopoly share a common interest in keeping prices high and/or quantities low.
However given that all other members adhere to this implicit or explicit agreement, the individual
firm is tempted to cheat on the explicit or implicit agreement by undercutting prices or producing
more. This temptation may be controlled by the threat of a punishment (e.g. a price war) provided
that oligopolists care enough about the future and that the cheating is soon detected with a
sufficiently high probability. Thus the trust between firms is supported by a threat! For a survey on
this, see the section on oligopoly in Martin, Møllgaard, Overgaard & Schultz (2000).
Trust supported by threat was a key issue in the recent lysine cartel case. The FBI recorded a
meeting of the cartel by candid camera. Mr. Wilson, an American cartel member and executive of
the leading producer of lysine Archer Daniels Midland, explained to his Japanese and Korean
colleagues that
“I am going to say something very simple.  If we are going to trust each other, okay,
and if I’m assured that I’m gonna get 67,000 tons by the year’s end, we’re gonna sell
it at the prices we agreed to …  [W]e need to talk here because we are going to get
manipulated by these God damn buyers … [T]hey can be smarter than us if we let
them be smarter. They are not your friend. They are not my friend. And we gotta have
´em. Thank God we gotta have ´em, but they are not my friends. You’re my friend. I
wanna be closer to you than I am to any customer. …  They’re gonna tell you ‘I could
buy it cheaper’. They’ll outright lie to you. That’s their job. You can believe ´em if
you want to. If you trust us, and that’s the key thing, if you trust us, you know that we
aren’t doing it.” (Source: video tape from the U.S. Department of Justice, see also
Hammond, 2001).
But he also did not fail to mention that their capacity was at least four times current production and
that this extra capacity could be used, as he poetically put it, if the rivals initiated a “free for all.”
5Tacit collusion occurs when oligopolists arrive at an implicit collusive agreement without ever
talking to each other. The underlying idea is that the market situation is so obvious that a common
understanding evolves in the minds of the business men of the cartel price and of the punishment
that would result from cheating. In some instances tacit collusion is as powerful as explicit collusion
that typically involves some kind of information exchange between firms. This would be the case
when markets are very transparent and stable: that makes detection of cheating easy and the threat
of a punishment more imminent. Clear and present danger of tough retaliation discourages
defection. This is why market transparency may be a mixed blessing, see Møllgaard and Overgaard
(1999, 2001).
In many markets, however, oligopolists need to meet and agree on prices. This is exactly because,
in the absence of transparency, it becomes important for them to exchange information about prices,
quantities and market shares in order to make sure that nobody cheat and that all members get their
“fair share.” Such collusive devices may take the form of secret meetings to exchange information,
internet-based chat rooms, trade associations or even certain kinds of electronic B2B market places.
Collusive devices increase the efficacy of collusion by increasing the speed with which cheating is
detected or the probability that it is detected or both. This means that punishment for detection
comes sooner and/or is more likely. In turn prices and profits will often be higher if a collusive
device is in place. “Trust, but verify”vi as Ronald Reagan said, quoting Gorbachev quoting Lenin,
on signing the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty.
Assume for example that a price setting duopoly is producing a homogeneous good with constant
marginal and average costs. The firms would like to agree on charging the monopoly price, but
absent collusive devices it takes a number of periods (say weeks or months) before they observe
prices and then only with a certain probability. Their common discount factor indicates how much
the firms value future income. I can now show (Møllgaard, 2002) that tacit collusion on the
monopoly price can be sustained by Bertrand-Nash punishments only if the discount factor is higher
than a critical discount factor that depends on the lag and probability of detection. If a collusive
device increases the probability or the speed of detection then the requirement to the discount factor
becomes less strict, as illustrated by Table 2:
Table 2: How the critical discount factor depends on detection lag and probability of detection
Probability of detection of cheatingCritical discount factor: d*
0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 0.80 0.67 0.57 0.50
2 0.85 0.78 0.73 0.71Detection lag
3 0.87 0.83 0.81 0.79
For example: if, absent a collusive device, it takes three periods before it is possible to detect
collusion and if the probability of detection is only 0.25 at that time, then the discount factor needs
to be at least 0.87; otherwise collusion cannot be sustained and prices would be as low as marginal
costs. This is because the punishment comes late and only with a low probability. Assume that the
discount factor is in fact 0.75 and that the duopolists meet and agree on a collusive device that
lowers the detection lag to one period and makes detection completely certain. Then because of this,
prices increase from the competitive level to the monopoly level.
6This is more than a theoretical proposition. Improved reliability of information can lead to price
increases (Albæk, Møllgaard & Overgaard (1997)). We showed that with the advent of firm-
specific information on previously secret discounts in an oligopolistic market for ready-mixed
cement in Denmark  prices increased of the order of 15-20 per cent in a quarter or two.
The upshot of all this is that collusive devices such as the exchange of information may increase
prices and profitability to oligopolists. This will lead to a decrease of welfare and efficiency for the
usual reasons of deadweight loss: Customers face a price that is too high and hence buy too little.
Trust-busters’ problems
Tacit collusion is not illegal! Firms engaging in tacit collusion have done nothing explicit to collude
– they have just read the market in a manner that maximized their profit and the value of the firm.
Posner (1976, 40) notes that:
“… in some circumstances competing sellers might be able to coordinate their pricing
without conspiring in the ususal sense of the term – that is, without any overt or
detectable acts of communication. This is the phenomenon that lawyers call
‘conscious parallelism’ and some economists term ‘oligopolistic interdependence’ but
which I prefer to call ‘tacit collusion’ in contrast to the explicit collusion of the formal
cartel or its underground counterpart.”
In EU practice a concerted practice is the closest we come to proving collusion without there being
a smoking gun e.g. in the form of evidence of secret meetings. How ver Fejø (1997, 41) argues that
pure tacit collusion is not the same as a concerted practice:
“In certain market structures, e.g. in an oligopolistic market, the parties will thus
sometimes be able to mutually adjust their behaviour without a prior consensus. In
such a situation a concerted practice in the sense of art. [81] will not obtain.”vii
Faulk & Nikpay (1999, 2.52) observe that the European Court of Justice in its Anic judgement of 8
July 1999 clarified that proof of concerted practice required three elements: 1) contact between
firms; 2) subsequent behaviour in the market; and 3) a causality between the two.
Collusive devices are mechanisms that make collusion easier. It could be rather informal
arrangements such as concerted practices or more formal arrangements such as information
exchanges through trade associations or secret cartel meetings. Such arrangements are illegal and
will be punished if competition authorities discover their existence (and can prove it).
Since tacit collusion is not illegal in contrast with collusion that is not tacit, and since we expect
firms to go always for the lowest-cost way of achieving a certain outcome, we would expect tacit
collusion to prevail if the discount factor of the companies is higher than the critical discount factor
in this particular market. And there is preciously little that competition authorities can do about that
situation in the current legal situation. But even if courts were willing to punish tacit collusion there
would remain a very difficult problem: how to show that behaviour is collusive rather than
competitive. The problem  stems from the non-observability of marginal costs that is ubiquitous in
the economics of regulation and antitrust. Kühn (2001) thus argues that even in the unlikely
antitrust case that would allow authorities to use modern time series econometricsviii w  would
7encounter a serious problem of identifying prices, say, as collusive rather than competitive because
the inference would typically depend critically on the specification of the econometric model.
If the actual discount factor is below the critical discount factor for which tacit collusion may be
sustained, we would expect firms to carry out a cost-benefit analysis of whether to collude explicitly
or not. Benefit from a certain collusive device, x, can be denoted B(x) and would typically be the
present value of discounted extra profits arising from x. The costs C(x) could consist of four
different elements:
1. The cost of the device itself, c(x). This could be the cost of meeting secretly in a hotel room
in Maui, Hawaii (as in the Lysine cartel); the cost of concocting a trade association in order
to monitor prices; or the cost of a cartel enforcement authority that could have access to the
members’ order books and be allowed to issue fines for cheating!
2. The expected cost of the fine, f(x). This would in itself be composed of three elements: a)
the probability of detection by the cartel authorities; b) the likelihood of being convicted if
detected; and c) the fine itself that would typically depend on the seriousness of the crime.
All three elements would normally depend on the choice of collusive device, i.e. on x.
3. The expected damages d(x) to be paid to customers. These will typically be tried at court
after the establishment of f(x) and depend on the same factors.
4. The loss of reputation from the association with collusion. This is not easy to estimate, but
may in some cases be significant. In the following I will ignore this potentially important
effect.ix
Thus a certain collusive practice could be considered by rational firms if the benefits exceed the
costs:
B(x) > C(x) = c(x) + f(x) + d(x).
The problem facing trust-busters is now: Given the scarce resources of the authority to make as few
collusive devices profitable ex ante as possible. That is, the policy should deter as many of the
grave collusive devices as possible. This is basically a problem of finding the optimal trade-off
between the probability of detection (and conviction) and the magnitude of fines taking into account
the cost of enforcement as studied by Polinsky & Shavell (1979,1992). Their main result is that the
optimal fine equals the damages inflated by the probability of not being detected plus the variable
enforcement costs. In an antitrust setting, this is related to a result by Landes (1983). To see the
point, assume that the only cost of a collusive device is the expected fine, i.e. C(x) = pf(x),  wh re p
is the compound probability of detection and conviction. Further assume that a given collusive
device raises profits to the parties by EUR 1 million while inflicting damages on customers to the
order of EUR 2 million (all numbers are discounted present values). So the damage to society is
EUR 1 million. If firms are risk neutral, they will be discouraged from agreeing to the collusive
device only if:
B(x) = EUR 1 million < C(x) =pf(x)
This means that we need the fine f(x), to exceed B(x)/p. If the probability of detection is one-third,
we need fines of at least EUR 3 million to deter collusion. See also Blomgren-Hansen & Møllgaard
(1999).
8This treatment of the optimal structure of fines has however so far assumed that there is no strategic
interaction between the members of the collusive scheme. In practice, leniency schemes may be
used to increase the probability of detection as well as the probability of conviction.
As one would almost imagine, it was the U.S. that pioneered the leniency programme in antitrust.
After a revision in 1993, the main features of the American policy are (see Spratling, 1999)
· Amnesty is automatic if the authority has not yet started an investigation and the firm
approaches the antitrust authorities to confess.
· Amnesty may still be available after an investigation has been initiated if the company
provides crucial evidence without which the authority could not hope for “sustainable
conviction”.
The EU Leniency programme was enacted in 1996 through a notice from the Commission. It is
presently under review and the new policy is similar to the American programme:
· “A decisive contribution to the opening of an investigation may justify the immunity from
any fine …” (EU Commission, 2001, 18)
· while cooperation with trust-busters after an investigation has been opened will justify a
reduction in the fine, reflecting the value of the contribution.
Evidently these leniency programmes are designed to bust the trust between parties to a collusive
device. DOJ’s Antitrust Division warns that “applicants understood that early detection gave them a
head start in the race for amnesty, and they were unwilling to gamble that the activity would not be
detected by another company who would take advantage of the Amnesty Program.” Spratling
(1999) further notes that:
“We frequently see situations where a company approaches the government a few
days, or even less than one full day, after one of its conspirators has already
approached the Division and secured its position as first in line for amnesty. Of
course, as in all things, timing is everything. In two recent cases, being second in the
door ended up costing companies tens of millions of dollars in fines as well as
criminal exposure for the culpable executives.”
The question is what the effect of leniency programmes really is. On the one hand they increase the
probability of detection, but on the other hand they decrease the expected punishment. Secondly, it
is not evident in all cases that firms will be persuaded by these incentives, i.e. that trust must bust.
Must trust bust?
I should like to end by first discussing some simple leniency games that focus only on the decision
of whether to confess or not. Then I will try to indicate how complex leniency games depend on the
repeated nature of typical collusive devices. This allows firms to include punishment strategies in
prices that may dissuade a firm from going for amnesty although this might have been profitable
seen from the point of view of the simple game. My point of departure is the work of Motta & Polo
(1999).
Assume that two firms have set up a collusive device, x. The firms realise that a leniency
programme is available. If both firms keep silent there is a certain probability, p, that the authority
9opens an investigation, detects collusion and convicts the two firms in which case both firms pay
the maximum fine f(x). If one firm confesses, this is sufficient evidence to convict them both. We
will assume that if only one firm confesses it will pay a reduced fine (x) while th rival pays f(x). If
both confess, a simple toss of a coin will determine who is considered to have done so first; that
firm will pay the reduced fine while the rival again will have to pay the maximum fine. Since fines
are negative payoffs we assume that f(x) < r(x) £ 0. Amnesty or immunity from fines correspond to
r(x) = 0. The game played by the two firms may now be represented in the well known bi-matrix:
                  firm 2
Confess don’t
Confess ½[f(x)+r(x)], ½[f(x)+r(x)] r(x) , f(x)
Firm 1
Don’t f(x) , r(x) pf(x) , pf(x)
Trust may bust: It is easily shown that (Confess,confess) is a Nash equilibrium. Note, however, that
(Don’t,don’t) may also be a Nash equilibrium if the expected fine from not confessing is larger than
the reduced fine: pf(x) ³ r(x); in other words if the compounded probability of detection and
conviction is too low compared with the leniency programme. We would then expect (Don’t,don’t)
to be played since it Pareto dominates (Confess, confess)x o trust does not bust in this case. This
may be seen as a justification of making r(x)/f(x) very low as in the case of amnesty. On the other
hand if the probability is high enoughxi then the game reduces to the familiar prisoners’ dilemma. In
the latter case we know that absent repeated interaction the only Nash equilibrium is an equilibrium
in dominating strategies: to confess. Now, trust must bust.
These results extend in several obvious ways.
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In the opposite case cartel members’ mutual trust will not bust. This will happen for all (negative)
values of r(x), if p(N-1) < (N-1)/N indicating that the confession of all parties is relatively important
for successful conviction. N t to confess is an equilibrium if p(0)f(x) ³ p(1)r(x).
Now consider a sequential game of leniency where the firms are queueing up in front of the office
of the antitrust authority. In a subgame perfect equilibrium there will either be a rush to confess
(early firms confess to get the reduction of fines because otherwise later firms would do it) or
nobody will confess at all. This again depends on how the reduction of fines relates to the increase
in the probability of conviction that accrues from each confession.
All these small games show that leniency programmes should be concocted for the case at hand: in
order that not to confess not be an equilibrium in a situation where p(0) = 0 it may for instance be
necessary to break the trust between firms by offering them amnesty or even a positive payment for
confessing! The latter may conflict with ethics and practical problems: what is the evidence worth if
the authority has paid money to get it?
The leniency games that we discussed so far have been seen in isolation from the underlying
repeated game that supports the collusive device. This is a little odd and in my current research I am
trying to make the connection between the dynamic price or quantity strategies of the oligopolists
and how they respond to leniency programmes. The first, simple insight is that members might
discourage each other from confessing by threatening to start a price war in the future. This reduces
the gain from the reduction of the fine. That was the stick. But there is also a carrot: Cartel members
might understand that if they all do not confess then there are two possible outcomes: They may not
be convicted and can carry on with implementing their collusive device. Or they may be convicted
and will probably have to stop the collusive device but could then choose to retreat to tacit collusion
rather than abandoning collusion altogether.
This is to a certain extent modelled by Motta & Polo (1999) but they assume that if the parties are
convicted then they will behave non-cooperatively forever after. Competition policy is probably not
this potent and empirically the proposition seems dubious. Secondly, they assume that firms only
have the choice of whether to collude or not. In reality of course, a leniency programme may affect
the way in which (or the degree to which) they collude. A leniency programme described by p(·),
f(x) and r(x) will affect the x that is optimal for the firms. Oligopolists will choose the maximal
degree of collusion that is sustainable by appropriate punishment strategies. My current research
endogenises the choice of collusive device and addresses these more complex leniency games. A
more lenient competition policy may increase the incentive to confess but will at the same time
decrease the expected punishment. Thus designing the optimal policy is a tricky question and may
differ from case to case. Maybe hard core cartels are more robust to trust busters than softer
variants?xii
So in sum: Oligopolies may collude as long as they do it tacitly. Often they are tempted to engage in
covert collusive schemes because tacit collusion may not be enough for them. Competition policy
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should be designed to discourage this behaviour. This is partly done through fines but leniency
programmes can be designed to foster distrust. Must trust bust? The answer is: it depends!
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Endnotes
                                         
i On competition policy harmonisation of the candidate countries, see Lorentzen & Møllgaard (2001).
ii The exception was resale price maintenance which, seen from an economics point of view, was odd in itself. See
Albæk, Møllgaard & Overgaard (1995) or Møllgaard, Overgaard & Øhlenschlæger Madsen (1996).
iii The latter fine was issued by the Court of Frederiksberg on the other side of Solbjerg Vej!
iv Thanks to Clas Wihlborg for this slogan!
v Section 1 of the Sherman Act: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person
who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or,
if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court."
vi Doveryay, no proveryay...
vii My translation.
viii See la Cour & Møllgaard (2002) for an ex mple of use of co-integration techniques to establish market dominance.
ix In the case of SAS and Mærsk Air, SAS appeared to suffer much more from a loss of reputation than its partner in
crime. Indeed, Mærsk Air was to some extent lauded by members of the business community for its effective way of
handling the situation. The same cannot be said for SAS!
x pf(x) ³ r(x) ³ ½[f(x)+r(x)]
xi p  > r(x)/f(x)
xii Trust is the result of a risk successfully survived.Andy Gibb (unknown date).
